# INQ *"TRANSFERRED* DESCRIPTIONS" OR *BASIC* DESCRIPTIONS ": D° D° /G, ms<sub>G</sub>, V/

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# UNIVERSALITY

THERE EXISTS A PREVIOUSLY IGNORED VERY FIRST DESCRIPTIONAL LEVEL

## "BENEATH": NO CONCEPTUAL PLACE FOR A DETERMINISTIC CONCEPTUALISATION

"ABOVE": MODELS M(D°), YES. BUT NOT "BENEATH".

## AND THIS LEVEL IS: ALWAYS GLOBALLY STATISTIC: IT IS PRIMORDIALLY STATISTIC

### STATISTICITY IS BASIC, IT IS *PRIMORDIAL*

## CAUSALITY AND DETERMINISM ARE *MODELIZATIONS* TRANSFERRED DESCRIPTIONS ARE A BASIS FOR A *GUIDED*, *MOUNTING* MODELIZATION

## NAIVE REALISM CAN BE *PROVED* TO BE ILLUSORY (KANT)

## RELATIVISATION IS NOT RELATIV*ISM*,

## RELATIVISATION INDUCES SECURITY, PRECISION



## MRC

A GENERAL METHOD OF RELATIVISED CONCEPTUALIZATIONTION, FINITE, EFFECTIVE, FOUNDED ON BASIC TRANSFERRED DESCRIPTIONS.

## **TWO DESCRIPTIONAL STRATA**

## D<sup>o</sup>: A basic level of primordially statistical transfer into first observability, pulverised in space and in time: CLASSICALLY IGNORED

M(D<sup>o</sup>, V<sub>i</sub>), V<sub>i</sub>: A classical level of "objects", *models* M(D<sup>o</sup>,V<sub>i</sub>), laid on an illusory *general* deterministic model of the physical processes. UP TO NOW WE HAVE WORKED ONLY WITH MODELS, DIRECTLY

http://www.mugur-schachter.net/

"Publs. sur site", points 7, 9

### **TELEGRAPHIC** *MRC*

#### I. General preliminaries

Quasi systematically false absolutes are found to generate false problems and paradoxes that hinder the understanding and block the elaboration of knowledge. The history of thought swarms with examples.

### The specific goal of *MRC* is:

To offer a structured system of norms for conceptualizing in a relativized way that excludes by construction the possibility of false problems or paradoxes.

The germ of *MRC* lies in the peculiar qualitative form of the primordial descriptions of microstates that this author has first fuzzily perceived *beneath* the formalism of quantum mechanics (QM) and then, has constructed explicitly and *quite independently of the mathematical formalism of QM*, inside the epistemological-physical discipline baptized *infra-quantum mechanics:* IMQ (MMS [2011]).

Then the construction of MRC has been started from zero and quite *independently of IMQ*. MRC has been developed in a *deductive* way, in the sense of current logic.

The germ of MRC

 the peculiar descriptional form of microstates involved in QM – re-emerges inside MRC, but only in a rather advanced stage and directly with a status of full generality. The epistemological strategy brought into evidence inside IMQ played the role of a guide. Then, once constructed, MRC guided in its turn the explicit construction of IMQ.

Such are the intricate zigzags that work inside human minds.

The succession of systematic relativizations introduced along any chain of descriptions that leads from a zero-point of conceptualization – a basic transferred description – to a piece of conceptualization no matter how complex, protects from *any* surreptitious insertion of false absolutes.

On each trajectory of conceptualization and for any descriptional cell from it, no matter how 'simple' or 'complex' it is, these relativizations reproduce *like a FRACTAL character* a same recurrent basic descriptional *form* symbolized  $D/G, \varpi_G, V/.$ 

*MRC* generates hierarchical *chains* of mutually connected relativized descriptions of the form *D/G,ms<sub>g</sub>,V/*.

These chains meet in node-descriptions and thus form *descriptional nets*.

MRC has generated *relativized reconstructions* of: \* natural logic, \* the probabilistic conceptualization, \* the informational conceptualization of Shannon, *a representation of 'complexities' where the semantic contents are fully preserved*. \* a representation of 'time' *drawn from a-temporal elements* (MMS [2006]).


### II. Enumeration of the basic characters and elements from MRC

We present MCR by a mere *enumeration* of the main characters and concepts involved in MRC. The connective considerations and the comments are filtered out. Thereby the logical-semantic features that express the character of *necessity* of the constructive process, and unite the elements of MRC into an organic whole, are suppressed here. This leaves place for an impression of arbitrariness. Furthermore the semantic contents are mutually disconnected. This destroys the perceptibility of the flux of their growth during the construction. Only reading of other expositions of MRC (MMS [2006], [2002B] and [2002A], http://www.mugur-schachter.net/, publications/site, points 7, 9) can convey the perception of MRC as a rigorously constructed and intimate UNITY of factual contents and of rational structure.

### **General characters**

\* By construction every counting or numerical character involved in *MRC* is *FINITE*: *MRC is conceived as a strictly effective method*. Any infinity can be understood only in terms of *relativized absences of a priori limitation*.

\* The ACTOR is called "consciousness-functioning" and is denoted CF and symbolized by \* The content of the "descriptional pool" – at any given moment – is called "reality" and is denoted  ${f R}$ .



(G,œ<sub>G</sub>,V) \*\*\*\*\*

(1) Any MRC-description is explicitly relative to a given triad (G,œ<sub>G</sub>,V):
\* G denotes the operation of generation

physical, or abstract or both –

by which the entity-to-be-described is made available for being qualified.

The specification of G is required to include an explicit indication of the domain of reality R<sub>G</sub> on which G is applied.

 $* \alpha_{G}$  denotes the *entity-to-be-described* itself introduced by G,

A one-to-one relation G⇔æ<sub>c</sub> is posited between the operation of generation G and the entity-to-be-described æ<sub>c</sub> that is introduced by G. This one-to-one relation is not a fact, it is a methodological posit.

\* V denotes the "view" by which the object-entity is qualified.

### (2) The description that is relative to a given triad $(G, \varpi_G, V)$ is quite generally denoted by the symbol $D/G, \varpi_G, V/$ .

(3) Any view V is endowed by definition with a strictly prescribed structure, namely:

\* A *view V* is a *finite* set of *aspect-views Vg* where *g* is an aspectindex:

 $V=\cup_a Vg, g=1,2...m$ , with *m* a finite integer.

\* An aspect-view Vg (in short: an aspect g) is a semantic dimension of qualification (colour, weight, etc.) able to carry any finite set of 'values' gk(g) of the aspect g that one wishes to consider

(for 'colour': one can choose only the 'values of colour' indicated by the words 'red', 'yellow', 'green',

to each one of which is associated a sample;

C: (g1(g))=cred(c), (g2(g))=c.yellow(c), (g2(g))=c.green(c)

(the symbol *gk(g)* functions like a *unique* index different from *g* alone).

An aspect-view *Vg* is defined *iff* are defined all the devices (instruments, apparatuses)

as well as all the material or abstract operations on which is based the assertion that an examination of a given object-entity via the aspect-view *Vg* 

has led to this or that – unique and definite – value *gk(g)* of *g* (if not to *none*): *CODING of the 'values'* 

\* So a view V is a finite FILTER for qualification: with respect to aspects or values of aspects that are **not** contained in it by its initially posited definition, a given view V is **blind**: it simply does not perceive them. \* The qualifications of space (*E*) and time (*T*) are achieved via a very particular sort of *frame-views V(ET)* (reducible, if convenient, to only a space-frame-view *V(E)* or only a time-frame-view *V(T)*).

The features enumerated above generate a concept of 'qualificator' very distant from the 'predicates' from the classical formal logic and from the grammars of current languages.

\* \* \* \* \* \* \* \* \*

## (4) Given a pair (G,Vg), the two epistemic operators G and Vg can mutually exist, or not.

\* If any examination by Vg of the entity-to-be-described  $\varpi_{g}$ introduced by the generator G does produce one well defined result (gk), then the aspect-value (gk) of g exists with respect to G, (there is mutual existence between G and (gk)).

A fortiori, there also is mutual existence between the aspect g itself and the operation of generation G. In this case the pair (G,Vg) constitutes a one-aspect epistemic referential.

This means that in this case, if one applies to the object-entity  $\varpi_{G}$  introduced by *G*, an examination by *Vg*, so if one produces the operational succession *[G.Vg]*,

then one *might* obtain a corresponding 'description" of  $\varpi_{g}$  via the grid for qualification *Vg*.

Mutual existence of an operation of generation G of an entity-to-be-described  $\varpi_G$ , and an aspect-view Vg,

is the *MRC*-expression of the fact that the aspect g has emerged by abstraction from a class of entities to which  $\varpi_{g}$  does belong. \* If on the contrary what is defined to be an examination by Vg, when applied to the object-entity  $\varpi_{g}$ , yields no definite result,

then there is *mutual in-existence* between Vg and  $\varpi_{g}$ ( $\varpi_{g}$  does not exist relatively to Vg and *vice versa*). (A song does not exist relatively to the grid for qualifying wight, and *vice versa*).

Then the initial tentative matching (G, Vg) has to be eliminated *a* posteriori as unable to generate a relative description  $D/G, \varpi_G, Vg/$ : it is non significant from a descriptional point of view.

Mutual inexistence between  $\varpi_{g}$  and Vg expresses in *MRC* terms that the entity  $\varpi_{g}$  does not belong to the class of entities that have contributed to the construction of Vg by a process of abstraction.

#### So:

The pair of concepts of mutual existence and mutual inexistence constitutes the MRC-expression of the fact that a qualification can be applied only to the entities that have participated to the genesis of this qualification.

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\* These considerations can be extended in an obvious way to also any pair *(G,V)* 

where  $V = \bigcup_g Vg$ , g = 1, 2...m contains a finite number *m* of aspectviews *Vg*.

In this case one speaks of the possibility, or not, of an epistemic referential (G, V).

\* \* \* \* \* \* \* \* \* \* \*

#### (5) The space-time frame-principle.

Consider a space-time view denoted *V(ET)*. In consequence of the following principle that concerns only *physical* object-entities it is called a *space-time frame-view*.

Any physical entity-to-be-described does exist relatively to at least one aspect-view Vg that is different from any space-time frame-view V(ET); it is NON-existent with respect to any space-time frame view V(ET) considered ALONE, separately from any aspect-view Vg that is different from any space-time aspect ET.

When *G* generates a physical entity, the view *V* from *(G,V)* includes by convention a space-time frame-view *V(ET)* as well as at least one aspect-view *Vg* different from any spacetime aspect.

In particular V(ET) can be reduced to exclusively a space-frameaspect V(E).

\* \* \* \* \* \* \* \* \* \* \* \* \*

(6) Consider a pair (G,Vg) where G and Vg do mutually exist. So the pairing (G,Vg) does constitute an epistemic referential where it is possible to construct the relative description  $D/G, \varpi_c, Vg/$ 

### of the entity-to-be-describe $\boldsymbol{\varpi}_{G}$ produced by $\boldsymbol{G}$ .

\* If after some number N of repetitions of the succession [G.Vg] only one and the same value (gk) of the aspect g is systematically obtained, the corresponding relative description  $D/G, \varpi_G, Vg/$  is said to be an 'Nindividual' one-aspect description (or an 'individual description' relatively to N repetitions of [G.Vg]), N being finite).

#### So inside MRC,

in order to include the case of entities to be described that are 'consumed' by an examination via Vg, an "individual" description requires *repetitions* of the operational succession [G.Vg],

and is relative to the number of these repetitions.

\* If the obtained value (gk) in general varies from one realization of the succession [G.Vg] to another one, the corresponding relative description  $D/G, \varpi_G, Vg/$  is said to be a non-individual description. Iff in this case, via a large but finite number N' of series of N repetitions of [G.Vg], one can discern some '(N-N')-stability, -- with respect to explicitly defined criteria of 'precision' then it will be said that  $D/G, \varpi_G, Vg/$  is an '(N-N')-stable statistical description. \* If, though *G* and *Vg* had been initially found to mutually *EXIST*, no sort of stability is finally found, neither individual nor statistical,

then we say that a description  $D/G, \varpi_G, Vg/$  corresponding to this pair G and Vg does not 'exist'.

Then the epistemic referential *(G,Vg)* is discarded a posteriori.

\* All the preceding assertions can be generalized to the case that the utilized view V contains more than only one aspect-view Vg:

one has then to realize – separately in general – repetitions of *all* the sequences of operations *[G.Vg]* for *all* the aspect-views *Vg* from *V*.

Exclusively the whole of all the final *qualifications* thus obtained will be said to constitute the obtained description  $D/G, \varpi_G, V/$ itself:

By definition, the triad (G,œ<sub>g</sub>,V) is not included in the obtained description, it only reminds of its genesis.

And again by definition,

the description itself 'exists' only if some stability does manifest itself with respect to *all* the involved aspect-views. But the *degree* of stability is permitted to vary with the aspect-view Vg from V, so it is relative to Vg. So, like a description  $D/G, \varpi_G, Vg/$ , a description  $D/G, \varpi_G, V/$  also, can be found to be either an individual relative description or a statistical relative description (then endowed with some '(N-N')-stabilities').

#### \* Consider now a description in which

the operation of generation creates an entity-to-be-described that has *never been examined before* and of which the observable manifestations – for some non-restricted reason – cannot be *directly* observed

(for instance, the chemical structure of a sample of rock dislocated by a robot sent on the moon that is equipped with apparatuses able to identify the chemical structures and to transmit the result on a computer screen in an earth-laboratory). The descriptions of this sort form

the primordial stratum of the human conceptualizations of physical reality.

The qualifications produced by a description from this primordial stratum consist exclusively of observable marks 'transferred' via 'measurement interactions' on registration devices of measurement apparatuses.

A description of the specified kind is called *a basic transferred description*.

\* Inside a relative description D/G,œ<sub>G</sub>,V/ the 'generator', the 'entity-to-be-described and the view are not fixed entities, they are descriptional **ROLES** freely assigned by the observer-conceptor,

accordingly to his own descriptional **AIMS**, to this or that available physical or conceptual element: The entity that in one description holds the role of a view can be put in another relative description in the role of entity-to-be-described, or of operation of generation.

This sort of freedom – characteristic of *MRC* – is one of the sources of the unrestricted applicability of this method to any process of conceptualization subjected to the constraint of excluding by construction the false absolutes.

(7) Reconsider the fact that a view V is by definition a union of a finite number *m* of aspect-views Vg :  $V=\cup_g Vg, g=1,2...m$ .

Each aspect-view Vg introduces its own semantic g-axis that carries the 'values' gk(g), k=1,2,...w(g)chosen for being considered on g (w(g) is the cardinal of the set of values considered on g). So V introduces by construction the abstract representation space defined by the set of its m semantic g-axes. It follows that: Any relative description D/G, $\varpi_{G}$ ,V/ consists of a cloudy finite structure, namely a finite 'points-form' of (gk)-value-points with g=1,2...m, k=1,2,...w(g)contained in the m-dimensional representation-space of the view V introduced by D/G, $\varpi_{G}$ ,V/.

If the object-entity  $\varpi_{G}$  is of *physical* nature one must add inside V a discreet space-time view V(ET) and then the relative description  $D/G, \varpi_{G}, V/$  becomes a cloudy finite structure or 'form' of (*space-time-(gk)-value)-points* with g=1,2...m, k=1,2,...w(g), and x,y,z,t, some finite space-time grid upon which the units of space and time impose a discrete set of possible space-time values; this whole form being contained in the (*m+4*)-dimensional representation-space introduced by the view V.

(8) One can form *chains* of relativized descriptions, connected via common elements from either their respective entities-to-be-described  $\boldsymbol{\omega}_{G}$ (so somehow connected via the involved operations of generation G), or from the structures of their views V. Along such a chain there exists a *descriptional hierarchy* or *order*. In general the order 1 is conventionally assigned to the first description from that chain; the second description connected to the first one is then of order 2 with respect to this first description (a *meta-description* with respect to the first one); the third description is assigned the order 3 and it is a meta-description with respect to the description of order 2 and a meta-meta-description with respect to the first description from the chain). Etc.

So in general the order of a description from the chain). Etc. So in general the order of a description inside a given chain is relative to the process of construction of *that* chain. But consider the case of a chain of descriptions that starts with a basic transferred description.

> In such a case: The initial basic transferred description determines an ABSOLUTE beginning of a PARTICULAR process of construction of knowledge. Therefore, systematically, the order 0 is assigned to it.

### (9) Passage from a given description from a chain, to the following one, is commanded by the methodological 'principle of separation' PS :

Preliminary: Each relative description  $D/G, \omega_G, V/$ is accomplished inside an epistemic referential (G, V) where G - in consequence of the posited one-to-one relation  $G \leftrightarrow \alpha_c$  is tied to one entity-to-be-described  $\boldsymbol{\omega}_{G}$ ; and the view V consists of a given finite set of aspect-views Vg each one of which carries a *finite* set of aspect-values (gk). Furthermore the relative description  $D/G, \omega_G, V/$ emerges via a finite number of realizations of successions [G.Vg]. So a relative description  $D/G, \omega_{c}, V/$ is by construction a finite 'cell of conceptualization': if all the aspect-views from the global view V have been taken into account, and *each* one with *all* its values *gk*, and after the realization of an arbitrarily large but *finite* number of successions [G.Vg] performed for all the aspect-views Vg from V a descriptional invariant has been found, then the description  $D/G, \omega_G, V/$  has been *achieved* and thereby the descriptional resources of the referential (G, V)have been entirely exhausted. So if one wants to obtain some *new* knowledge *tied* with  $\omega_c$  and V, then one has to form *another*, and appropriate referential (G',V'), *different* from (G, V) either via a  $G' \neq G$  or via a  $V' \neq V$  or by both, and to construct this new desired knowledge inside (G', V').

Now, the principle of separation *PS* requires that: The *new* description *D/G',œ<sub>g'</sub>,V'/* be always achieved by a process *explicitly and entirely separated* from the descriptional process that has led to *D/G,œ<sub>g</sub>,V/*.

> Thereby any uncontrolled coalescence or confusion between the aims and the geneses of two distinct but connected relative descriptions is systematically avoided.

(10) In a chain that starts with a transferred description  $D^{0}$ , the immediately subsequent description of order 1 – as a whole – is put in the role of the new entity-to-be-described, in order to be qualified by a certain peculiar sort of view that assigns it 'values' of an 'aspect' with *definite (and usually* connected) space-time support. Thereby the unintelligible transferred description of order 0 becomes intelligible in the sense that it gains conformity with the space-time frame principle (6). A view that generates such conformity is called an *intrinsically* modelling view. The final result of such an explanatory description of order / can then be detached from its genesis. This leaves us with a *model* of the transferred description  $D^{0}$ . Still later inside the same chain it becomes possible to construct a meta-description of higher order that furthermore introduces the classical concepts of 'cause' and of 'locality' and thereby enters the classical domain of 'determinism'. So inside *MRC* there emerges a *split* inside the (evolving) set of all the relativized descriptions available at any given time: The very first relative descriptions from this pool - all of absolute order 0 constitute together a primordial stratum of conceptualization. And the classical models of these transferred descriptions together with the progressively more and more complex associations between such models, constitute a growing classical 'volume' of conceptualization. in this way MRC incorporates the famous '[quantum-classic] cut' and explains it in terms of a concept of a universal transition '[(transferred descriptions) => (classical descriptions)]'

(We say 'transition' and no more 'cut' because inside *MRC* the connection between a basic transferred description, and the models that 'explain' it, is defined in detail).

Any *knowledge* that can be communicated in a *non* restricted way (the action of 'pointing toward' restricts to real or virtual co-presence inside some delimited space-time domain,

as also do also mimics, emotional sounds, etc.) is *DESCRIPTION*.

Only descriptions can be *unrestrictedly* communicable *knowledge*.

'Facts' that are exterior to any psyche, or psychic facts (emotions, desires, etc.) that are not expressed by some more or less explicit description, verbal or of some other nature, are not 'descriptions', they are not unrestrictedly communicable *knowledge*.

When we say « I know this house » we spell out an illusion, either because of unawareness or for the sake of brevity. Only the assertion

« I know some *descriptions* (restricted plural) of this house » would rigorously express the situation toward which we want to point and that we we can realize.

\* \* \* \* \* \* \*

### And, last but crucial:

(12) When the concept of probability is re-constructed inside MRC, the "events", elementary or not, acquire the conceptual status of relativized DESCRIPTIONS: NAÏF REALISM IS SWEPT AWAY

The *MR*C descriptional status of probabilistic "events" is *not* that of an entity-to-be-described  $\varpi_{G}$ . It is that of a relative description of some involved entity to-be-described  $\varpi_{G}$ that *has to be radically distinguished from any one among its descriptions, whether realized or potential* (MMS [2006]).

### IF THE ENTITY IS KEPT THE SAME, ITS DESCRIPTIONS CAN BE VARIED FREELY AND *INDEFINITELY* VIA THE USE OF CONVENIENT VIEWS:

### THE PROBABILITY TREES, GENERALIZED, PENETRATE INTO THE VOLUME OF

**CLASSICAL CONCEPTUALIZATION** 

## IDEOGRAPHIC SYMBOLIZATION OF MRC

Consciousness functioning CF:  $\square$ 

### **Reality : R**

A generator G of object-entity :  $\Delta$ 

The "place" from R where  $\Delta$  works:  $R_{\Delta}$ 

The object-entity-to-be-qualified:  $\boldsymbol{\varpi}_{\Lambda}$ 

The process of delimitation of  $\mathfrak{A}_{\Delta}$  by  $\Delta_{:}$  $\Delta.\mathbf{R}_{\Delta} \Rightarrow \mathfrak{A}_{\Delta}$  or  $\mathfrak{A}_{\Delta} \Rightarrow \Delta.\mathbf{R}_{\Delta}$ 

**Comment on expressivity :** 

\*  $\Delta . R_{\Delta} \Rightarrow \varpi_{\Delta}$ : a process, that mentions its beginning and its result;

\*  $\mathfrak{A}_{\Delta} \Leftarrow \Delta . \mathsf{R}_{\Delta}$ : an explicit specification of an object-entity via the process that produced it (which permits to specify an unobservable object-entity, by the way of producing it).

### An aspect-view : Vg

The operation of examination of  $\boldsymbol{\varpi}_{\Delta}$  by  $\boldsymbol{V_{g}}$ :

Comment on expressivity : \* the epistemic operator  $V_g$  (in the sense of usual language, not of mathematics) \* the operation of examination  $V_g \varpi_{\Delta}$ 

A view : V.

The operation of examination of  $\boldsymbol{\varpi}_{\Delta},$  by  $V\colon V\boldsymbol{\varpi}_{\Delta}$ 

An epistemic referential : ( $\Delta$ ,V).

The representation of an observerconceptor:

[<sup>(]</sup>, (∆,V)].

( $\Delta$ ,  $\boldsymbol{\omega}_{\Delta}$ , V): RÔLES

The mutual *in*-existence :

 $\overline{a} \, \mathbf{c}_{\Delta} / \mathbf{V} \quad \mathbf{or} \quad \overline{a} \, \mathbf{V} / \mathbf{c}_{\Delta}$ 

The mutual existence :

 $\exists \mathbf{ce}_{\Delta} / \mathbf{V} \text{ or } \exists \mathbf{V} / \mathbf{ce}_{\Delta}$ 

A space-time view : VET.

The frame-principle :

 $\begin{array}{ll} [\exists \boldsymbol{\varpi}_{\Delta} / \boldsymbol{V}_{\boldsymbol{g}}] \rightarrow [\exists \boldsymbol{V}_{\boldsymbol{E}} T: \exists \boldsymbol{\varpi}_{\Delta} / (\boldsymbol{V}_{\boldsymbol{E}} T \cup \boldsymbol{V}_{\boldsymbol{g}})] \\ \forall \boldsymbol{V}_{\boldsymbol{E}} T, \forall \boldsymbol{\varpi} \quad [\exists \boldsymbol{\varpi} / \boldsymbol{V}_{\boldsymbol{E}} T] \end{array}$ 


Relative description:  $D/\Delta, \omega_{\Delta}, V/,$ 

Basic transferred relative description:  $D^{(o)}/\Delta^{(o)}, e^{\Delta^{(o)}, V^{(o)}}/\Delta^{(o)}$ 


Relative metadescription of order n, n=0,1,2,....:  $D^{(n)}/\Delta^{(n)}$ ,  $e^{\Delta^{(n)}}$ ,  $V^{(n)}/\Delta^{(n)}$ 

## The global ideographic representation of MRC:

{<sup>(,</sup>)</sup>, ∆, œ<sub>∆</sub>, V, (D<sup>(n)</sup>, n=0,1,... }



## ?? (G, V) ??



## AIMS PRIMARY DATA ? CONSTRUCTIONS VIEW OF FINAL AIMS VIEWS OF LOCAL AIMS CONCEPTION, ARTEFACTION SYSTEMS-ENGINEERING ESSENCE OF HUMANITY